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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Appellees were 
entitled to partial summary judgment in their favor, and that the homeowner's 
insurance contract between Defendant/Appellant, American Fire and Casualty Company 
("American"), and the Olson Appellees, gave rise to a duty to defend and indemnify 
the Olson Appellees in Taylor v. Olson, formerly pending in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County. The homeowner's insurance contract unambiguously and 
unequivocally excludes coverage for the matters, events and damages alleged by Myra 
Taylor against the Olsons in connection with the automobile accident of October 17, 
1987, as outlined in her Complaint. 
Regardless of whether this Court concludes the subject automobile accident 
constitutes an "occurrence" under the terms of the homeowner's insurance contract, 
such an "occurrence" must not fall within any of the applicable exclusions of that 
contract. In this case, the exclusions of the contract between American and the Olson 
Appellees unambiguously bar Appellees' claims for coverage in this case. 
Notwithstanding Appellees' delineation of Utah legal authority addressing 
insurance contractual obligations, there is no evidence in this case that American 
breached any fiduciary duty it may have owed to Appellees. Moreover, the trial court 
has specifically refrained from ruling with regard to Appellees' claim for bad faith 
against American, which claim has been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. 
Insofar as Appellees have never, at any time in these proceedings, raised the 
"dead storage" exception of the homeowner's insurance contract as a possible basis for 
coverage, they are not entitled to raise it before this tribunal at the present time. 
Even assuming, arguendo. Appellees were entitled to advance an argument regarding 
the "dead storage" exception, however, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate 
the foregoing exception is entirely inapplicable. 
The insurance contract between American and the Olson Appellees 
unambiguously excludes all the claims asserted by Myra Taylor in her Complaint 
against the Olsons, including the negligent supervision claim delineated in Count 5 of 
that Complaint. Moreover, there is no evidence that any of the three automobile 
exclusions contained in the subject insurance contract are ambiguous, just as there is no 
evidence of ambiguity with respect to the "dead storage" exception to the foregoing 
exclusions. In addition, the Order granting partial summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees, which comprises the entire basis for this appeal, includes no findings that 
any of the automobile exclusions, or the "dead storage" exception, are vague or 
ambiguous. Accordingly, Appellees cannot now contend any such ambiguities exist, nor 
are they entitled to have them addressed by this tribunal for the first time. 
As noted above, all of the causes of action contained in the Taylor Complaint, 
including Count 5, are unequivocally excluded under the terms of the insurance 
contract. Further, the exclusion for statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability is not 
contrary to public policy, nor is it void. 
Even assuming, arguendo, the exclusions of the homeowner's contract did not 
definitively bar coverage for all those causes of action asserted in the Taylor Complaint, 
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American would not be bound by the self-serving Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order prepared by counsel for Taylor prior to becoming counsel for Taylor and 
the Olsons, insofar as Taylor v. Olson addressed issues collateral to the items at issue 
herein. 
Finally, there is no basis for an award of attorney's fees against American, 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The assertions made by 
Appellees in support of this claim are entirely unsupported by the documents on file 
with the Court herein, as well as those documents filed with Judge Noel in the trial 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INVOLVING 
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON AND MYRA TAYLOR CONSTITUTES AN 
"OCCURRENCE" UNDER THE TERMS OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE OLSONS AND AMERICAN, SUCH OCCURRENCE IS 
UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXCLUDED UNDER THE TERMS OF THAT CONTRACT. 
Regardless of whether this Court determines the automobile accident involving 
Jennifer Heather Olson and Myra Taylor on October 17, 1987, constitutes an 
"occurrence," as defined by the homeowner's insurance contract between the Olson 
Appellees and American, Appellees are not entitled to coverage under the terms of the 
foregoing contract. Rather, as discussed extensively in the Brief of Appellant, the 
homeowner's insurance contract unambiguously and unequivocally excludes coverage for 
the matters, events and damages alleged by Myra Taylor against the Olsons in 
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connection with the automobile accident of October 17, 1987. Therefore, even if 
Appellees have met "the first prong of this two-step process," as they contend, they 
cannot meet the second prong in light of the clear exclusionary language of the subject 
contract comprising the subject matter of this lawsuit. See Brief of Appellees, at 12. 
n. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE TO DEMONSTRATE AMERICAN 
BREACHED ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY IT MAY HAVE OWED TO THE OLSON 
APPELLEES, NOR IS THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE CONTRACT 
AMBIGUOUS IN ITS EXCLUSION OF COVERAGE FOR THOSE CLAIMS 
ASSERTED BY APPELLEES. 
Notwithstanding the delineation of Utah legal authority addressing first-party and 
third-party insurance contract obligations in the Brief of Appellees, there is no evidence 
in this case that American breached any fiduciary duty it may have owed to Appellees. 
In fact, while Judge Noel granted Appellees' motion for partial summary judgment on 
the basis of a finding of coverage under the terms of the subject insurance contract, he 
specifically refrained from ruling with regard to Appellees' separate claim for bad faith 
against American. 
American acknowledges, as Appellees contend, that Utah Courts "have 
established certain rules or standards of interpretation with respect to exclusions and 
ambiguities in insurance policies, even when fiduciary duties are not involved." (See 
Brief of Appellees, at 14.) In fact, American discusses Utah legal authority addressing 
interpretation of insurance contracts in its Brief. (See Brief of Appellant, at 16.) As 
noted in American's Brief, while an ambiguous term in an insurance contract should be 
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construed in favor of coverage, unambiguous terms should be "construed according to 
[their] usual and ordinary meaning." Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 
1274 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
It is difficult to conceive of exclusions more unambiguous than those contained 
in the insurance contract at issue in this litigation. The foregoing contract 
unequivocally excludes coverage for any bodily injury or property damage arising out of 
"the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles . . . owned or 
operated by or rented or loaned to an insured." The homeowner's insurance contract 
between American and the Olson Appellees further contains an exclusion for bodily 
injury or property damage stemming from "the entrustment by an insured of a motor 
vehicle . . . to any person." Further, coverage under the insurance contract is excluded 
for "statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or minor" 
using a vehicle excluded under either of the foregoing provisions. To the extent that 
Myra Taylor's claims against the Olsons in the Taylor v. Olson litigation arose directly 
from Jennifer Heather Olson's use of a vehicle owned by Ronald Olson, the foregoing 
exclusions unambiguously and definitively bar any claim for benefits Appellees could 
assert under that insurance contract. 
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ffl. 
APPELLEES ARE BARRED FROM RAISING ANY ARGUMENT REGARDING 
THE "DEAD STORAGE EXCEPTION" OF THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE 
CONTRACT. 
It is a fundamental rule that a reviewing court will not address an issue or 
argument raised for the first time on appeal. Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & 
Loan, 899 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1995); Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's 
Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, reh. den., cert, den., 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
Although there are exceptions to the foregoing rule, these exceptions are carved 
narrowly. As this Court noted in US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 886 P.2d 
1115, 1119 (Utah App. 1994), reh. den., such exceptions do not arise in the absence of 
"extraordinary circumstances or plain error." No such exceptions are applicable to the 
issues raised by Appellees for the first time in these proceedings in their Brief filed 
March 8, 1996. 
Appellees are now urging this Court to find that none of the three automobile 
exclusions in the subject insurance contract apply to the claims of Myra Taylor insofar 
as such exclusions are subject to a "dead storage" exception in the contract. As an 
initial matter, Appellees offer no reason for their failure to raise this argument for the 
first time on appeal in an opposition brief, notwithstanding the fact they have been 
arguing about coverage under the insurance contract for several years. Presumably, no 
such justification exists. 
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More significant than their lack of justification, however, is that Appellees' 
argument clearly does not fall within either of the two exceptions Appellees cite under 
which a reviewing court may address an issue notwithstanding its being presented for 
the first time on appeal. First, Appellees contend that "the issue of whether the 
Volkswagen was in 'dead storage' is one of law only . . . . See Brief of Appellees, at 
18, footnote 21. They do not offer any explanation or legal authority in support of the 
foregoing statement, but rather, hold the foregoing assertion out, by itself, as the 
justification for the "question of law" exception to the rule. 
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines a question of law as "[a]n issue 
which involves the application or interpretation of a law and hence within the province 
of the judge and not the jury." Under the foregoing definition, whether the 
Volkswagen was in "dead storage" at the time of the automobile accident involving 
Jennifer Heather Olson and Myra Taylor would not appear to constitute a "question of 
law," but rather, is an issue involving the factual circumstances present in this case. 
The undisputed facts of this lawsuit, which are cited and relied upon by Appellees in 
their Brief, definitively establish the Volkswagen driven by Jennifer Heather Olson on 
the night of October 17, 1987, was not in "dead storage." Accordingly, there exists no 
question regarding the foregoing issue, either of fact, or of law, and, therefore, the 
"question of law" exception to the rule that an issue may not be raised for the first 
time on appeal does not apply. 
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The second argument advanced by Appellees in support of their contention they 
are entitled to raise the "dead storage" exception of the insurance contract for the first 
time on appeal is that "the issue of whether the Volkswagen was in 'dead storage' . . . 
is plainly decisive of the entire controversy on the merits, and it is further clear no 
possible advantage was had by either party in not obtaining a ruling on it in the trial 
court." See Brief of Appellees, at 18, footnote 21. If the Court accepts Appellees' 
assertion that the "dead storage" exception is plainly decisive of the entire controversy 
in this case on the merits, for purposes of this appeal, the foregoing exception is plainly 
decisive of this case in favor of Appellant. As discussed more fully below, even if 
Appellees had an entitlement to raise the "dead storage" exception now, there is no 
conceivable basis for its applicability to the undisputed facts of this lawsuit, facts to 
which Appellees cite in their own Brief. 
Finally, Appellees' argument that "there was no possible advantage to be had by 
either party in not obtaining a ruling on it in the trial court" is wholly without merit. 
There have been no Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law with regard to this issue, 
nor did Judge Noel address it in connection with his ruling on Appellees' motion for 
partial summary judgment. American is clearly at a disadvantage in this case in being 
forced to respond to an issue that was never raised during the several years that have 
elapsed in these proceedings, and was never addressed by Judge Noel in his ruling on 
the motion for partial summary judgment, which ruling comprises the basis for this 
entire appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 
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(Utah 1987), "matters not raised at the trial court level will not be considered by this 
Court on appeal, particularly when the problem could have been resolved below." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellees can offer no basis or justification for their failure to raise the issue of 
the "dead storage" exception contained in the homeowner's insurance contract until 
March 8, 1996, the date on which they filed their Brief in connection with this appeal. 
Accordingly, insofar as Appellees can demonstrate no basis for the application of an 
exception to the rule that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, 
Appellees are not entitled to raise the "dead storage" exception at present. 
IV. 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO RAISE THE 'T>EAD 
STORAGE" EXCEPTION ON APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE DEMONSTRATE THAT EXCEPTION IS 
INAPPLICABLE. 
As noted above, Appellees are not entitled to raise the "dead storage" exception 
as an issue on appeal, where they have had numerous opportunities over the course of 
the past several years to address this exception, and have never done so. Further, it is 
clear that Appellees' failure to raise this exception prior to this appeal cannot be 
obviated by the narrowly-carved exceptions to the rule that an issue may not be raised 
for the first time on appeal where it is not raised in the trial court. 
Even assuming, arguendo. Appellees were entitled to raise the "dead storage" 
exception for the first time on appeal, the foregoing exception is entirely inapplicable in 
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light of the undisputed facts and circumstances at issue in this case. The insurance 
contract at issue in this litigation unambiguously and unequivocally excludes coverage 
for any bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, 
use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles owned or operated by, or rented or loaned 
to an insured. In addition, the insurance contract contains a specific exclusion for 
bodily injury or property damage stemming from the entrustment by an insured of a 
motor vehicle to any person. Coverage under the insurance contract is further 
excluded for statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or 
minor using a vehicle excluded in either of the foregoing provisions. (R 43) 
Appellees contend that these three exclusions, which would otherwise preclude 
coverage under the insurance contract, are inapplicable in light of the "dead storage" 
exception outlined in the contract. This exception provides that the three exclusions 
delineated above do not apply to "a vehicle or conveyance not subject to motor vehicle 
registration which is . . . in dead storage on an insured location." (R 43) An 
examination of the undisputed facts and circumstances surrounding this lawsuit, as well 
as a review of extensive legal authority addressing the "dead storage" exception cited by 
Appellees, demonstrates their attempted reliance on this exception is wholly misplaced. 
Appellees further contend that "[t]he Volkswagen Jennifer Heather Olson was 
driving on the night of the accident was in 'dead storage' since it was not registered, 
insured, licensed, roadworthy, and was not to be driven on the public highways." See 
Brief of Appellees, at 15. The foregoing statement completely contradicts assertions 
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made in the Statement of Facts portion of this same Brief, however. For example, 
Appellees state: "Heather had taken the 1974 Volkswagen Bug automobile on 
numerous occasions prior to the accident on October 17, 1987, and for various types of 
activities such as going to school, going riding with friends, going to weekend parties 
where alcoholic beverages were served, etc." See Brief of Appellees, at 7. Appellees 
further contend, in their Statement of Facts: 
Heather was in the habit of taking the keys to the 1974 
Volkswagen Bug out of her parents' dresser drawer in their 
bedroom . . . . 
Heather would take an old license plate from the garage of 
her parents' home and put it on the Volkswagen whenever 
she would take it. The license plate belonged to her sister 
Heidi's former Suzuki automobile. 
See Brief of Appellees, at 8. 
Appellees are asking this Court to accept their factual representation that 
Jennifer Heather Olson drove the vehicle involved in the accident with Myra Taylor 
"on numerous occasions" prior to the night on which that accident occurred. A few 
pages later in this same Brief, however, Appellees are asking this Court to conclude 
the foregoing vehicle, which Jennifer Heather Olson drove with some frequency, was 
actually in "dead storage," and, therefore, that the three automobile exclusions 
contained in the insurance contract are inapplicable. In addition to being completely 
contradictory, the foregoing arguments are not even supported by the legal authority 
discussed in the Brief of Appellees to advance those arguments. 
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One of the three cases cited by Appellees in support of their contention the 
Volkswagen Bug involved in the automobile accident with Myra Taylor was actually in 
"dead storage" is Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 68 N.CApp. 184, 314 S.E.2d 
552 (1984), rev den. 311 N.C. 761, 321 S.E.2d 142. A review of the facts of this case, 
and the legal theories on which its holding is based, reveals it is inapposite to the 
instant appeal. 
In Allen, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina addressed a claim for property 
damage arising from a fire which ignited while the insured was attempting to charge 
the battery of an inoperable motorcycle. The motorcycle, which was unregistered and 
uninsured, had been stored on the patio of the insured's apartment for six months, 
continuously, because mechanical damage had rendered it totally inoperable during that 
period. Id. at 554. The owner of the motorcycle decided to move it into his living 
room on a day he was not working for the purpose of charging the battery, checking 
the timing mechanism, and determining what repairs were needed to render it 
operable. As the Allen Court noted, the vehicle could not be driven, and the insured 
"had no repair parts available and did not intend to repair it that day." Id. A fire 
subsequently ignited in the insured's living room when the motorcycle tipped over on 
top of his coffee table. 
The insured then made a claim under his homeowner's insurance contract for 
damages caused by the motorcycle igniting in his living room. His insurer denied this 
claim, citing the exclusion for damage arising out of the "ownership" and "maintenance" 
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of a motor vehicle. Id. at 555. The Allen Court ruled in favor of the insured, 
however, noting the foregoing exclusion did not apply, and stated: 
It was [the insured's] handling of combustible materials 
(newspapers, plastic floor covering, gasoline, oil) in the 
immediate vicinity of ignition sources (an operating electrical 
battery trickle charger and an open light bulb as a timing 
light left upon a metal frame of the motorcycle) which 
created a risk covered by Nationwide-Fire's policy against 
personal liability and caused the fire . . . . We hold that 
the property damage which occurred did not arise out of 
either the ownership or the maintenance of the Honda 
motorcycle. 
Id. 
The Allen decision is easily distinguished from the facts of the instant case in 
that it involved an accident that occurred within the home of an insured, which 
accident did not arise out of the ownership or maintenance of a motor vehicle, but 
rather, the handling of combustible materials within that home. Conversely, the 
accident at issue in Taylor v. Olson arose directly from the operation of a vehicle 
owned by the insured, which accident occurred away from the Olsons' home, while the 
vehicle was in operation. 
Another crucial distinction between the Allen decision and the instant case is the 
fact that in Allen, the motorcycle at issue could not be driven for six months prior to 
the date on which the subject accident occurred. In this case, however, the undisputed 
facts cited by Appellees establish the 1974 Volkswagen Bug was driven by Jennifer 
Heather Olson "on numerous occasions" prior to the night of the accident, and, 
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therefore, that such vehicle was in fact in operable. In upholding the trial court's 
determination the motorcycle had been in dead storage at the time of the subject 
accident, the Allen Court noted not only that the vehicle was not registered or insured, 
but also, that it was not operable at the time of that accident. By Appellees' own 
admission, the Volkswagen involved in the accident with Myra Taylor was in fact very 
"operable," as evidenced by the fact Jennifer Heather Olson was driving it on the night 
of such accident, as she had on numerous prior occasions. 
Similarly, in Beale v. Lawrence, Shelby Law No. 67 (April 8, 1985, Tenn. App.), 
the second case cited by Appellees, that court ruled a vehicle was in "dead storage," 
and, therefore, not subject to the automobile exclusions in a homeowner's insurance 
contract, where that vehicle was inoperable for several months prior to the occurrence 
giving rise to the coverage claim. Again, Beale is easily distinguished from the instant 
factual situation, which involves a vehicle that was, by Appellees' own admission, 
operable at the time of the subject accident. 
The only other legal authority cited by Appellees in support of the application 
of the "dead storage" exception in this case is Allstate Ins. Co. v. Geiwitz, 86 Md.App. 
704, 587 A.2d 1185 (1991). As with Allen and Beale, an examination of the facts and 
issues addressed in Geiwitz reveals that it, too, is inapposite to the circumstances at 
issue in the instant case. 
In Geiwitz, the plaintiff purchased an automobile for the sole purpose of 
restoring it "for show purposes," and kept it at the home of his parents while he 
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disassembled it. Id. at 1185-86. The plaintiff proceeded to restore the vehicle over the 
course of approximately two years, and during his deposition testified that when the 
restoration of the vehicle was completed, he did not drive it, even to exhibitions, but 
rather, used a truck-pulled trailer. Further, the plaintiff noted the foregoing vehicle 
was "just for show. It wasn't made for driving." Id. at 1186. 
One evening Mr. Geiwitz drove the vehicle to his parents' garage for the 
purpose of fixing the gas gauge, and brought a kerosene heater from the garage of 
their home. When the plaintiff drained the gas from his vehicle prior to fixing the 
gauge, it overflowed in a bucket and ignited the kerosene heater, ultimately resulting in 
extensive fire damage to his parents' home, as well as the destruction of the plaintiffs 
vehicle. Id. 
The plaintiff, who resided in his parents' home, was deemed to be an insured 
under the terms of their homeowner's insurance contract. Although the homeowner's 
insurer, Allstate, compensated the plaintiffs parents for the property damage to their 
home, it filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the destruction of 
the vehicle was covered under the policy, and relied upon the contract's exclusion for 
property damage arising from "the ownership, maintenance, use, occupancy, renting, 
loaning, entrusting, loading or unloading of any motorized land vehicle or trailer." Id. 
The insured contended, however, that the foregoing exclusion was rendered inapplicable 
by the following exception in the contract: "[T]his exclusion does not apply to . . . a 
-15-
motorized land vehicle in dead storage or used exclusively on an insured premises . . . 
." Id. at 1187. 
In addressing the question of whether the Geiwitz vehicle was in "dead storage" 
at the time of the subject accident, the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed numerous 
cases from other jurisdictions, including the Broadway, Holliman, Prudential Property, 
and North Star cases discussed extensively below, all of which conclude the vehicles at 
issue did not fall within the "dead storage" exceptions of the various homeowner's 
insurance contracts. After analyzing the facts and holdings in each of these cases, the 
Geiwitz Court concluded: "The primary difference between these cases and the case 
sub judice is the fact that Geiwitz kept the car as a collectable, not as a means of 
transportation." Id. at 1188 (emphasis added). The transportation of the Geiwitz 
vehicle "via a truck-pulled trailer" stands in stark contrast to the undisputed use of the 
Volkswagen at issue in this litigation, Le., being driven "on numerous occasions . . . and 
for various types of activities such as going to school, going riding with friends, going to 
weekend parties where alcoholic beverages were served, etc." See Brief of Appellees, 
at 7. 
In reaching its decision, the Geiwitz Court also noted that "one court . . . has 
held that a car can undergo maintenance and still be in dead storage," and cited Beale, 
the decision referenced by Appellees in their Brief and discussed, supra. In 
distinguishing the facts and holding of the Beale decision, published exclusively on 
LEXIS, the Maryland Court of Appeals delineated the following reasons for the 
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decision of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in finding coverage under the "dead 
storage" exception of the policy at issue therein: 
The court concluded that it was in dead storage for several 
reasons: (1) the car had been inoperable for several 
months, (2) the car did not have a current city sticker, and 
(3) the owner used another vehicle for transportation. The 
court also noted that even if the owner successfully had 
moved the car from the carport to his parents' residence, 
"the simple movement of the vehicle did not affect its 
status." That is, the mere fact that the owner moved the 
car from one storage site to another did not take the car 
out of dead storage within the meaning of the insurance 
policy. 
Id. at 1189 (quoting Beale) (emphasis added). As noted above, Beale is easily 
distinguished from the instant case for several reasons, including the fact that Jennifer 
Heather Olson was not merely moving the Volkswagen "from one storage site to 
another" at the time of the accident with Myra Taylor, but rather, was driving the fully-
operable vehicle as she had on "numerous occasions" prior to that evening. Further, 
unlike the vehicle in Beale, the Volkswagen had not "been inoperable for several 
months." Id. 
Case law from numerous other jurisdictions further illustrates the inapplicability 
of the "dead storage" exception to the claims of Appellees in the instant case. In 
Bowen v. The Hanover Ins. Co., 599 A.2d 1150 (Me. 1991), for example, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine denied benefits to an insured under a homeowner's insurance 
contract for personal injury liability arising when the insured's pickup truck rolled from 
his yard into an adjacent street. The pickup truck had not been operable for more 
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than five months prior to the subject accident, was not registered, and had a dead 
battery, and, therefore, the insured asserted the foregoing vehicle, which he intended to 
sell or "scrap," was in "dead storage" at the time of the accident. Id, 
Notwithstanding the foregoing undisputed facts, the Bowen Court rejected the 
insured's arguments regarding the applicability of the "dead storage" exception, and 
stated: 
The fact that this vehicle was unregistered, disabled and not 
in use does not change the fact that this accident happened 
because the object was a motor vehicle and for no other 
reason . . . . Dead storage means that the vehicle is placed 
in some condition where it has no potential to cause harm 
because of its attributes as a vehicle. 
Id at 1151 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Broadway v. Great American Ins. Co., 465 So.2d 1124, 1125 (Ala. 
1985), the Alabama Supreme Court concluded injuries sustained by a homeowner while 
priming an automobile carburetor with gasoline were not covered under his 
homeowner's insurance contract, which contract contained an exclusion for injuries 
"arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of . . . a motor 
vehicle owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured . . . ." The Broadway 
Court rejected the insured's assertion that the vehicle, which had remained undriveable 
at his home for approximately three months, was in "dead storage," thereby invoking an 
exception to the foregoing exclusion in the insurance contract. In reaching its decision, 
the Court noted: 
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As this Court perceives the terms "dead storage" and 
"maintenance of a motor vehicle," they are mutually 
exclusive. In other words, a motor vehicle in dead storage 
is one which is not undergoing maintenance, while a vehicle 
which is undergoing maintenance cannot be in dead storage. 
Id at 1127 (emphasis added). 
In a case involving similar factual circumstances, Holliman v. MFA Mut. Ins. 
Co., 711 S.W.2d 159 (Ark. 1986), the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed a claim for 
coverage under a homeowner's insurance contract arising out of an accident occurring 
when the brother of an insured poured gasoline into the carburetor of an automobile 
which was never registered or licensed. The vehicle did, however, have inflated tires, 
water in the radiator, and likely had gasoline in the tank, and was, in the words of the 
Holliman Court, "essentially ready to drive, except it would not start." Id. 
The brother of the insured sustained injuries when he attempted to start the 
foregoing vehicle, during which attempt the gasoline ignited and burned him. Id. After 
the brother of the insured sued the insured, Holliman, he in turn requested coverage 
under the terms of his homeowner's insurance contract with MFA Mutual Insurance 
Company. MFA denied this request, however, relying on the following exclusion in the 
insurance contract: "This policy does not apply . . . to bodily injury or property 
damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading, or unloading 
. . . [of] any motor vehicle owned or operated by, or rented or loaned to any insured 
. . . ." Id. Holliman in turn cited an exception to the foregoing exclusion contained in 
the insurance contract, which provided the exclusion did not apply "if the motor vehicle 
-19-
is not subject to motor vehicle registration because it is used exclusively on the 
residence premises or kept in dead storage on the residence premises." Id. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the insured's contention that the "dead 
storage" exception applied to the vehicle resulting in harm to his brother, and 
concluded it was undergoing maintenance at the time the accident occurred. In 
reaching its decision, the Holliman Court cited the opinion of the Alabama Supreme 
Court in Broadway, supra, and noted: "We agree . . . that when a vehicle is being 
maintained, as it was in this case, it is not in dead storage. The facts in this case 
present no substantial evidence that this vehicle was in dead storage within the 
meaning of the policy." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Mascair v. 
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 619 So.2d 108, 110 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1993) ("An 
automobile undergoing maintenance cannot be in dead storage and vice versa"); North 
Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 442 N.W.2d 848 (Minn.App. 1989) (Inoperable vehicle 
which had not been driven or moved for four years and undergoing repairs for sale was 
not in "dead storage," notwithstanding fact that vehicle was covered with weeds and 
hay); Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allaire, 25 Mass.App. 159, 516 N.E.2d 179 
(1987) (Unregistered, uninsured vehicle "taken off road" by owner and undergoing 
maintenance held not to be in "dead storage"). 
Similarly, in Hollis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 416 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ga.App. 
1992), the Court of Appeals of Georgia concluded a vehicle that had not run in more 
than two years, and had been stored in a homeowner's driveway during the foregoing 
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period, nonetheless constituted a "motor vehicle" under the terms of a homeowner's 
insurance contract, and, therefore, fell within the contract's exclusion for "bodily injury 
or property damage . . . arising out of the . . . ownership, maintenance, use, loading or 
unloading of motor vehicles . . . owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any 
insured." The Hollis Court based its decision in substantial part upon the fact that, 
while the vehicle was not operable at the time of the subject accident, it was equipped 
with a battery and tires, and the claimants had been "attempting to use the car as a 
motor vehicle." Id. at 829. 
In Robertson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 565 (Conn.App. 1990), the 
Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected a claim for benefits under a homeowner's 
insurance contract in connection with damages sustained by the insured's antique 
automobile which had been stored in the garage of insured's home. In upholding the 
trial court's findings, the Robertson Court stated: 
The policy excludes coverage for "motorized land vehicles 
. . . designed for travel on public roads as subject to motor 
vehicle registration." The trier found that the plaintiffs car, 
even disassembled met this definition of a motor vehicle. 
The trier found that the vehicle was designed for highway 
travel would be subject to vehicle registration when that use 
was made, and that the vehicle did not meet the definition 
of personal property. 
Id. at 566 (emphasis added). 
As noted above, Appellees have never, at any point in these proceedings, raised 
the "dead storage" exception to the automobile exclusions of the homeowner's insurance 
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contract as a basis for a finding of coverage under that contract Accordingly, the 
summary judgment order entered by Judge Noel, and from which this appeal arises, 
never even considered the foregoing exception, and, therefore, it should not be 
considered by this Court. However, assuming, arguendo, that Appellees had properly 
raised this argument earlier in these proceedings, the undisputed facts of this case 
definitively establish the "dead storage" exception is inapplicable. By Appellees' own 
admission, the Volkswagen driven by Jennifer Heather Olson on the evening of 
October 17, 1987, was in fact operable, and had been driven by the seventeen-year-old 
on "numerous other occasions." These facts stand in stark contrast to the legal 
authorities outlined above, including those cited by Appellees, which involve vehicles 
deemed to be in "dead storage" due largely to the fact they were inoperable at the 
time the relevant incidents occurred. 
Finally, there is no basis for Appellees' assertion they are entitled to coverage 
under the terms of the insurance contract since the phrase "dead storage" is not 
expressly defined within the contract. According to Appellees, because the phrase 
"dead storage" is not addressed in the "Definitions" portion of the insurance contract, it 
is "at best ambiguous, thereby allowing this Court of Appeals to construe the term 
most strictly against American Fire and most broadly in favor of coverage for the 
Olsons." See Brief of Appellees, at 16. 
The foregoing argument is wholly inconsistent with basic laws of insurance 
contract interpretation. As American noted in its Brief, insurance contract provisions 
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limiting or excluding coverage should be construed against the insurer, and that 
ambiguous language "fairly susceptible to different interpretations should be construed 
in favor of coverage." U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 
1993) (citations omitted). If an insurance contract is not ambiguous, however, "no 
presumption in favor of the insured arises and the policy language is construed 
according to its usual and ordinary meaning." Alf, 850 P.2d at 1274 (citations omitted). 
In addition, terms in an insurance contract "are not necessarily ambiguous simply 
because one party seeks to endow them with a different interpretation according to his 
or her own interests." Id. at 1274-75 (citations omitted). 
Addressing the interpretation of insurance contracts in Robertson, supra, the 
Appellate Court of Connecticut noted: "[W]e will not 'torture words to import 
ambiguity.'" Id. at 566 (quoting Carley v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 10 Conn.App. 
135, 142, 521 A.2d 1053 (1987)). Applying this principle, the Robertson Court rejected 
the insured's claims that various terms in the insurance contract at issue were 
ambiguous, and should be resolved in his favor. In reaching this decision, the court 
relied upon the fact that "[njothing in the trier's memorandum of decision indicates that 
he found the specific terms of the insurance policy to be vague or ambiguous . . . ." 
Id. In this case, just as in Robertson, there was no finding by Judge Noel, in granting 
the motion for partial summary judgment, that the phrase "dead storage" was vague or 
ambiguous, nor is there any other evidence to support such a finding. 
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There is no basis for Appellees' claimed entitlement to raise the "dead storage" 
exception as an issue on appeal, an issue they have had innumerable opportunities over 
the course of the past several years to address. However, even if they were entitled to 
raise the "dead storage" exception at the present time, the foregoing exception is 
entirely inapplicable in light of the undisputed facts and circumstances at issue in this 
case. As Appellees themselves contend, Jennifer Heather Olson drove the Volkswagen 
involved in the collision with Myra Taylor "on numerous occasions prior to the accident 
on October 17, 1987," and, therefore., that vehicle could not fall within the ambit of the 
"dead storage" exception of the homeowner's insurance contract. 
V. 
THE INSURANCE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OLSON APPELLEES AND 
AMERICAN UNEQUIVOCALLY EXCLUDES THE CLAIMS CONTAINED IN 
COUNT FIVE OF THE UNDERLYING COMPLAINT FILED BY MYRA TAYLOR 
AGAINST THE OLSONS. 
Count 5 of Taylor's Complaint against the Olsons, entitled "Liability of Ronald 
H. Olson and Carol D. Olson for Failure to Properly Supervise and Control the 
Conduct of their Minor Child Heather," is unambiguously excluded under the terms of 
the subject insurance contract. Insofar as Count 5 of the Complaint filed in the Taylor 
v. Olson litigation stems directly from Jennifer Heather Olson's use of a vehicle owned 
by Ronald Olson, the contract exclusions definitively bar any claim for benefits 
Appellees could assert under the terms of that contract. 
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Notwithstanding the clarity of the foregoing exclusions, Appellees are once again 
attempting to create the illusion of ambiguity in their discussion of vicarious parental 
liability, as well as "other exclusions" argued in Point 5 of their Brief. Just as with the 
"dead storage" exception raised by Appellees for the first time on appeal, however, 
none of the exclusions discussed in Point 5 of the Brief of Appellees were deemed 
vague or ambiguous by the trial court, nor were any of these exclusions found to be 
vague or ambiguous in the Order granting partial summary judgment which comprises 
the entire basis of this appeal1 
In support of their claimed ambiguities, Appellees provide extensive excerpts 
from the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Sandt, previously discussed above and 
by American in its Brief, as well as extensive excerpts from other cases addressing the 
construction of ambiguities and exclusions in insurance contracts, which excerpts are 
quoted in more than two full pages of footnotes. Following these case quotations, 
however, Appellees simply assert: "For the above reasons, the Plaintiffs [sic] submit 
there are at least the four (4) ambiguities discussed above with respect to the 
'exclusionary' language in the Defendant's [sic] insurance policy." See Brief of 
Appellees erroneously contend that American's assertion 
that the subject insurance contract is in no way ambiguous in its 
exclusion of coverage "is made without any citation to or 
discussion of even one case from Utah talking about what 
constitutes an 'ambiguity.111 See Brief of Appellees, at 20. 
Appellees have inexplicably overlooked that American does, in fact, 
cite to two decisions of the Utah Supreme Court discussing alleged 
ambiguities in insurance contracts, which decisions are discussed 
on the very page of American's Brief from which Appellees quote. 
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Appellant, at 25. (The "four ambiguities" to which Appellees refer, which are noted in 
footnote 25 of their Brief, are the "dead storage" exception discussed above, and the 
three automobile exclusions of the homeowner's insurance contract discussed extensively 
in the Brief of Appellant.) 
Judge Noel made no findings or conclusions of any kind in this case to support 
Appellees' assertion that any of the three automobile exclusions contained in the 
insurance contract, or the "dead storage" exception to these exclusions, were vague or 
ambiguous. Moreover, the Order granting partial summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees, which comprises the entire basis for this appeal, includes no findings that 
any of the automobile exclusions, or the "dead storage" exception, are vague or 
ambiguous. Accordingly, Appellees cannot now contend any such ambiguities exist, and 
should be addressed by this Court, especially in light of the fact that any such 
arguments could have been raised during the years this lawsuit was pending at the trial 
court level. See Robertson, 569 A.2d at 566; Mascaro, 741 P.2d at 938, 
Even if Appellees were allowed to present these claimed ambiguities at the 
present time, they have offered no basis for their assertion that any of these terms are, 
in fact, ambiguous. Instead of providing this foundation, Appellees provide some 
lengthy quotations discussing insurance contracts and ambiguities in general, yet at no 
point in their Brief do Appellees buttress the claimed "ambiguities" with a fact-specific 
discussion of the insurance contract and circumstances at issue herein. 
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Once again, Appellees appear to be hopeful that by claiming any item not 
specifically addressed in the "Definitions" section of the subject insurance contract is 
ambiguous, the homeowner's insurance contract should be found to provide coverage 
for the automobile-related claims asserted by Myra Taylor against the Olsons. As the 
Utah Supreme Court cautioned in Alf, terms contained in an insurance contract "are 
not necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with a 
different interpretation according to his or her own interests." 850 P.2d at 1274-75. 
VL 
THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OLSON 
APPELLEES AND AMERICAN UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXCLUDES COVERAGE 
FOR THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CLAIMS IN COUNT 5 OF THE 
TAYLOR V. OLSON COMPLAINT. 
As American discusses extensively in its Brief, the cause of action described in 
Count 5 of the Taylor v. Olson Complaint, entitled "Liability of Ronald H. Olson and 
Carol D. Olson for Failure to Properly Supervise and Control the Conduct of Their 
Minor Child Heather," is unequivocally and unambiguously excluded by the terms of 
the subject insurance contract. See Brief of Appellant, at 16-30. In addition, 
American's discussion of the foregoing negligent supervision claim includes a lengthy 
discussion of cases from numerous jurisdictions holding that such claims, as well as 
claims of negligent entrustment, are excluded under the terms of the homeowner's 
insurance contracts such as that entered into by American and the Olson Appellees. 
See Brief of Appellant, at 17-25. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the negligent 
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supervision claim of Myra Taylor against Ronald and Carol Olson is plainly excluded 
under the terms of the homeowner's insurance contract at issue herein. 
vn. 
THE EXCLUSION FOR STATUTORILY IMPOSED VICARIOUS PARENTAL 
LIABILITY CONTAINED IN THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE CONTRACT IS 
NOT CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY, NOR IS IT VOID. 
Appellees contend that the exclusion in the homeowner's insurance contract for 
statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability "is contrary to public policy and is 
therefore void." See Brief of Appellees, at 43. In support of this contention, 
Appellees cite to the sole authority of Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 231 
(Utah 1985). However, a review of the foregoing case reveals Appellees' reliance is 
misplaced, insofar as that authority addressed an exclusion and factual circumstances 
that are entirely distinct from those at issue in this case. 
In Farmers, a minor child was injured by an automobile driven by his mother. 
His father, as his guardian ad litem, subsequently filed an action against his mother to 
recover medical expenses in the sum of $120,000.00, and general damages in the 
amount of $1.5 million. Id. at 233. The Farmers Insurance Company automobile 
policy which was issued to the mother of the minor contained the following exclusion: 
This policy does not apply under Part I . . . 
to the liability of any insured for bodily injury to (a) any 
member of the same household of such insured except a 
servant . . . . 
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Id. The Utah Supreme Court subsequently held that the foregoing exclusion was 
contrary to public policy, as well as violative of the provisions of the No-Fault 
Insurance Act. Id. at 233-36. 
The instant case involves the application of an entirely different exclusion from 
that which was at issue in Farmers. Moreover, unlike Farmers, this lawsuit involves an 
accident in which the minor child was the tortfeasor, involved in an accident with 
someone outside of the household, as opposed to Farmers, wherein the minor child 
was the victim of another member of the household. 
The exclusion for statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability contained in the 
homeowner's insurance contract is valid under Utah law, and is not contrary to public 
policy. Moreover, the foregoing exclusion definitively bars any coverage for any bodily 
injury or property damage arising out of statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability 
for the actions of Jennifer Heather Olson in this case. 
VIIL 
AMERICAN SHOULD NOT BE BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE TAYLOR V. 
OLSON LITIGATION. 
As noted in its Brief, American acknowledges the general rule that "when an 
insurer, whose policy requires it to defend its insured, receives notice of a suit against 
him and is allowed an opportunity to defend, but refuses, is bound by the findings and 
judgement therein." McCartv v. Parks, 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). However, as the 
Utah Supreme Court also noted in that decision, this general rule "does not extend to 
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matters collateral or immaterial to the essential issues involved in the case, but is 
limited to those necessary to determination of the controversy between the immediate 
parties." Id. 
Based upon the foregoing authority, and the rationale of the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 987 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 
1993), reh. den. 992 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1993), discussed in the Brief of Appellant, 
assuming the exclusions of the homeowner's contract did not definitively bar coverage 
for all those causes of action asserted in the Taylor v. Olson Complaint, American 
would not be bound by the self-serving Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
prepared by counsel for Taylor prior to becoming counsel for Taylor and the Olsons. 
However, as discussed extensively above, and throughout the course of these 
proceedings, all the causes of action contained in the Taylor Complaint, including 
Count 5, are unambiguously excluded under the plain language of the homeowner's 
insurance contract, which includes a specific exclusion for bodily injury or property 
damage "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor 
vehicles owned or operated by an insured." 
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DC 
APPELLEES CAN DEMONSTRATE NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Assuming, arguendo, the claims of Myra Taylor against the Olson Appellees in 
Taylor v. Olson were not expressly excluded under the homeowner's insurance contract 
between the Olsons and American, Appellees would be entitled to recover their 
defense costs in this case under the terms of that contract. However, as discussed 
extensively above, and in the Brief of Appellant, all claims asserted in the Taylor 
Complaint were, in fact, unambiguously excluded under the plain language of the 
insurance contract between the Olson Appellees and American. 
The only other basis upon which Appellees assert a claim for attorney's fees in 
this case is Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As a basis for this claim, 
Appellees contend that American has failed to address Count 5 of the Taylor 
Complaint, and that American has not discussed the holding of Drysdale v. Rogers, 869 
P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1994), pertaining to claims for negligent supervision. A review of 
the pleadings and other documents on file with this Court in connection with the 
appeal, as well as those documents filed with Judge Noel, reveal the foregoing 
assertions are erroneous. Further, American has never contended, as Appellees 
suggest, that Utah law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent supervision. 
-31-
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, as well as upon the Brief of Appellant filed on 
January 2, 1996, American respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, and conclude the homeowner's 
insurance contract between American and the Olson Appellees unambiguously excludes 
coverage for all those matters, events and damages alleged by Myra Taylor against the 
Olsons as a result of the automobile accident occurring on October 17, 1987. 
DATED this of April, 1996. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
American Fire and Casualty 
Company 
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